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Abstract 
 
The present article investigates co-decision making with focus on the development of 
partnerships arrangements (PAs) between managers and trade-union representatives in 
a Danish multinational company which has grown through cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. The findings show the difficulties which trade-union representatives and 
management face in combining different forms of corporate governance and 
supporting PAs. The article argues that hybrid forms of PAs are unlikely to develop, 
due to historically embedded governance institutions, which create distinct 
expectations about how a firm must be controlled and who has the rights to exert this 
control.  
 
Key words: partnership, multinational corporations, national administrative heritage, 
institutions, corporate governance.  
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Introduction 
 
Over the past several decades, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have become the 
most prevalent form of growth and internationalization strategies for multinational 
companies (MNCs) all over the world. During the 1990s, the total number of 
corporate takeovers between companies of different national origins grew more than 
six-fold (Kang and Johansson, 2000), the largest proportion of cross-border M&As 
having taken place among European countries (OECD, 2003: 158n). These new forms 
of growth and internationalizing are likely to affect established relations between 
management and workers in the companies that are acquiring and being acquired. 
However, the consequences for co-decision-making in M&As have not been studied 
from an institutional perspective, and this requires greater research effort (Shimizu et 
al., 2004: 348). The article address the gap in the literature on how cross-border 
M&As might impact on established patterns of co-decision-making. The article 
answers the following questions: How do PAs work in companies resulting from 
cross-border M&As? Are the characteristics of PAs likely to change following cross-
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border mergers? Might a new hybrid governance model emerge from cross-border 
M&As? Alternatively, does a specific national governance model predominate? 
 
Co-decision-making has taken a number of different directions, progressing at 
different paces according to institutional environments and specific national paths. 
Due to the increasing number of cross-border M&As among multinational 
corporations (MNCs), the encounter between different national traditions of employee 
influence in organizational decision-making is becoming more common than ever. 
These encounters develop into complex social processes, since a multiplicity of actors 
with different national backgrounds are involved in coordinating and controlling 
multinational companies (Morgan, 2001; Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005; Ferner et al., 
2005).  
 
Cross-border M&As have been studied from a cross-cultural perspective in a business 
setting in which control mechanisms need to be negotiated between the different 
actors involved (Gertsen et al., 1998). The present article does not deal with cultural 
dimensions or cultural integration in M&As, its main focus being on how institutional 
heritage, or, as they have been called, different nationally bounded administrative 
heritages (Bartlett and Ghoshal,1989;  Calori et al.,1997), might affect established 
patterns of co-decision-making. 
 
In order to investigate co-decision-making through partnership arrangements (PAs) 
between managers and trade-union representatives in MNCs, the article focuses on 
one particular case that has not often been studied, of a Danish family-owned MNC 
which in recent decades has grown through processes of merger and acquisition 
between companies originally from Denmark, Germany and the US. In the process it 
has decided to introduce an American-inspired governance model, selecting American 
managers for top management positions and moving its headquarters to the US. 
 
Danish and American business systems and co-decision-making. 
 
The analysis below uses the historical neo-institutionalist approach, which treats 
social actors as acting within a framework of embedded economic relations, 
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influenced by a particular set of national institutional arrangements (Hollingsworth 
and Boyer, 1997). Institutional arrangements can both constrain and enable action by 
erecting barriers but also creating opportunities for the development of employee 
influence in decision-making. Institutional arrangements as reflected in national 
legislation, the nature of property rights, and the nature of educational and vocational 
systems shape the boundaries and possible paths for legitimate action. National 
institutions create the ‘rules of the game’ by which individuals and organizations 
operate, cooperate and compete. They forge the way organizations come into 
existence and the way they develop (North, 1990). Institutions involve shared, 
collective understandings or rules of conduct reflected in laws, governance 
mechanisms and the functioning of financial markets (North,1990; Scott, 2001), 
which help to define observed patterns of market exchange (Fligstein 1996). 
 
Governance systems and channels of co-decision-making are forged by a 
configuration of institutions involved in industrial relations, training systems, state 
interventions and financial intermediation (Whitley, 1999; Hollingsworth, 1997; 
Boyer, 2005). Thus, governance models present features − strengths and weaknesses 
−that are related to the institutions in which they are embedded.  
 
The dominant practices of firms in relation to governance models, work systems, 
reward systems and employee relations complement each other, thus forming 
distinctive national configurations (cf. Whitley 1999). As firms are created and grow 
in specific institutional environments, during the process of internationalizations they 
will bring with them the institutional distinctiveness of their home environments 
(Ferner,1997; Kostova, 1999; Whitley, 2001) what Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) and 
Calori et al. (1997) have called the ‘nationally-bounded administrative heritage’. As a 
result, MNCs need to coordinate and control relations in a variety of institutional 
environments which are composed of a multiplicity of embedded actors, taking with 
them experiences and taken-for-granted assumptions, as well as cognitive frameworks 
originating in distinctive institutional environments. According to this line of 
argument, the success of transferring and integrating practices of control and 
coordination is influenced by the degree of institutional similarity between a firm’s 
home country and its subsidiary’s host country (Kostova, 1999).  
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There is considerable evidence of this ‘country of origin’ effect on multinational 
corporations (Edwards and Ferner, 2002). The education and training of managers and 
representatives in their home countries are one of the most important institutional 
factors informing the behaviour of MNCs. Linked to the formation and training of 
managers are the governance models that different societies have developed (Whitley, 
1999).  
 
The countries involved in the M&As in this case are Denmark and the US. Denmark 
is an example of a co-ordinated market economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001), where, 
among other features, participation in decision-making has been an important 
component of national industrial regimes. The Danish business system, in spite of 
demonstrating liberal labour-market characteristics such as a low level of employment 
security, is typified by a strong trade-union movement and a tradition of co-operation 
between labour-market actors (Madsen, 2006; Brewster et al., 2007). In Denmark an 
agreement establishing co-operation committees was established as early as 1947 by 
the labour movement and the private employers’ associations. Even in highly 
Tayloristic industries, which historically have been characterized by strong 
adversarial relations, Danish companies are moving towards greater co-operation and 
trust between management and labour (see Hasle and Møller, 2007: 425) 
 
The Danish system of industrial relations is characterised by a high rate of 
unionization, which currently involves eighty percent of the workforce. There is a 
single channel for the representation of employees’ interests through trade unions, 
which responds to sectoral-level collective bargaining and almost monopolizes 
representation in the workplace. At this level, the shop stewards represent the workers 
who belong to their trade unions, and a convenor elected among all shop stewards 
represents the whole workforce on the company board. Representatives have the legal 
right to seat on the board and have easy access to top management. By having a seat 
in the co-operation committees, they are able to influence corporate strategy and 
development. 
 
An important feature of the Danish industrial-relations system is its “flexicurity” 
model. The Danish ‘flexicurity’ system has been characterized as combining labour-
market flexibility and social security (Madsen, 2006). An important feature of this 
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system is argued to be employers’ ability to hire and fire employees easily. However, 
an important, if not the most important effect of the ‘flexicurity’ system in recent 
years has been workers’ ability to upgrade their skills through continuous training, not 
only during periods of unemployment, but also at different stages in their working 
careers. What employees expect from their employers is support to upgrade skills 
which can be applied in current or future jobs. Danish trade unions are strongly 
involved in the governance of vocational and further training institutions (Kristensen 
and Rocha, 2006), which need to be co-ordinated locally by networks among 
convenors and shop stewards of different firms, who in this way become important 
gatekeepers of the flexicurity system. 
 
The US, which is also characterized as a liberal market economy (LME), has a strong 
anti-union tradition and a weak tendency for the participation of the workforce in 
decision-making. The literature points to several examples of American MNCs 
attempting to transfer their anti-union policies to their subsidiaries abroad (Muller, 
1998; Ferner et al., 2005).  
 
The US model of corporate governance assumes norms of self-interest, opportunism 
and enforced compliance (Lubatkin et al., 2005: 883). Increasing shareholder value is 
an important driver of senior management decision-making in American companies 
(Froud et al., 2000; Williams, 2000). The US model has been characterized as having 
an ‘outsider’ ownership structure, in which large firms are mainly owned by private or 
institutional portfolio investors, with little active interest in the day-to-day 
management of the firm. The ‘shareholder value’ model of capitalism emphasizes the 
primacy of the interests of shareholders over other stakeholders within the enterprise.  
 
American managers of publicly quoted corporations are inclined to maximize the net 
present value of the assets under their control. The proportion of profits made by 
American firms which is distributed to shareholders in the form of dividends and 
share buy-backs rose from an average of just under 50 percent in the 1960s and 1970s 
to around 70 percent in the 1980s and 1990s (O’Sullivan, 2000). The continuous 
waves of restructuring in firms guided by the ideology of American shareholder value 
prompted Froud et al. (2000) to predict that “late capitalism restructuring is likely to 
be a negative process for labour with transitory gains for capital” (ibid.: 795). 
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Other characteristics of American MNCs include the centralization, standardization 
and formalization of HR policy (Child et al. 2000). Clark and Almond (2006) argue 
that American firms are less tolerant of institutional constraints, even more so than in 
other LMEs. On the other hand, American firms make more frequent and significant 
changes to their strategies, structures and practices than companies originating in so-
called ‘co-ordinated market economies’ (CMEs) (Edwards et al. ,2005; Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). This feature would facilitate American firms introducing 
characteristics of a foreign model, and along with this, hybridization of different 
governance models (Pieterse,1994). 
 
Due to the clear differences between the institutional environments involved, the 
expectation was that managers and labour representatives in Denmark were likely to 
face problems in creating coherent relationships among the different organizational 
levels and actors involved. However, possibilities for reverse diffusion (Edwards et 
al., 2005) also exist, i.e. the American company learning and adapting some 
governance features from the Danish company. A third possibility, a hybrid (Pieterse, 
1994) form of governance, could also emerge, in which practices developed in one 
institutional environment are transferred to another and they both experience 
adaptation through their recombination with home-country governance practices 
(ibid.: 165). Based on a longitudinal and in-depth case study, the article presents 
evidence that hybrid forms of corporate governance are difficult to produce due to 
historically embedded institutions which create distinct expectations about how a firm 
must be controlled and who has the rights to exert this control.  
 
The article is arranged as follow. First, it discusses the concept of partnership as a new 
governance model. Secondly, the methodology of the research is presented. Then the 
specific case study becomes the focus, including the history of the merger, and the 
two different organizational phases are described. In presenting these two phases, the 
focus is on how PAs function at different organizational levels in linking the 
ambitions of the workforce to the strategy of the firm. Finally, the findings are 
discussed. 
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Partnership as a new governance model  
 
Currently, few organization theorists dispute the notion that the bureaucratic nature of  
organizations has given way to more flexible, innovative forms of work organization, 
with traditional divisions of work between manual and mental work becoming 
obsolete (Adler and Heckscher, 2006). The new canon specifies organizations whose 
association rules, forms of integration, organizational roles and responsibility 
boundaries are ambiguous and fluid. The search for continuous improvement and 
innovation strategies implies organizational co-operation in adjusting rules and formal 
and informal norms, which must be articulated at different levels into a distinct 
process of decision-making, which in turn becomes more collective and 
interdisciplinary. Under the new organizational model, deliberation through the 
creation of PAs seems to be fundamental for the survival of firms. This new paradigm 
of work organization is also a new paradigm for industrial relations. It needs 
coherence between institutions at the macro and micro levels.  
 
 “At the macro level the new system would involve a greater acceptance of unions in 
society and meaningful labor law reform and a growth oriented macro-economic and 
industrial policy, all derived from a rebirth of the political influence of the labour 
movement.”(Kochan, 1985: 345).  
 
Teague (2005) argues that partnership arrangements:   
 
“…seek to build a procedural consensus between management and employees so that 
organizations are better positioned to address unanticipated market and technological 
challenges. On this view, enterprise partnerships are considered to be an attempt to 
promote a process of guided evolution inside the firm so that managers and employees 
can adopt an open and idiosyncratic approach to balancing the needs of the workforce 
and the business”(ibid.: 568).  
 
Heery et al. (2003) argue that PAs can be benign to workers and unions, helping 
workers to achieve improved employment relations in emerging high-performance 
organizations (Osterman, 1999: 96) and to turn the new HRM practices to their 
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advantage (Bacon and Storey, 2000). Internal and external collaboration and pooling 
of expertise and resources can solve problems and enhance a firm’s performance in 
ways that confrontation or competition cannot (Child and Faulkner, 1998). In 
searching for improved products and processes, managers are driven to conduct a 
simultaneous search for good standards of employment and decent treatment of 
employees as a way to build and sustain partnership trust and high organizational 
performance (Walton et al., 2000). In PAs, in short, employees are much more 
involved in the governance of firms. Stuart and Lucio (2002) argue that there is 
support among trade unions in the UK for the principles of partnership, but there still 
is a fundamental deficit in terms of the presence and effectiveness of voice 
mechanisms at work (ibid.: 196). 
 
PAs are also met with scepticism and severe criticism. Although through PAs workers 
and unions favour an ideology of common interests which contributes to limiting their 
own independence, they find themselves captured by an agenda imposed by 
employers (Taylor and Ramsey, 1998). Danford et al. (2005) found predominantly 
negative patterns of employee experience with partnership in the UK aerospace 
industry due to management control strategies and the short-termist dynamics of 
British manufacturing capital.  
 
Experience in the US with partnership and employee participation in new work 
systems shows evidence of firms relying more on employees’ individual rather than 
collective voices (Appelbaum and Batt, 1994), leading to management-controlled, 
technology-oriented adjustments where the quality of working life has received less 
attention than in European countries (Yates et al., 2001: 520). Contrary to the 
collective orientation of empowerment in continental Europe, American management 
encourages productivity through human resource management techniques in which 
employees are expected to contribute by speaking directly and individually to 
managers.  
 
PAs do not operate – nor have they emerged – in an institutional vacuum. Like any 
other organizational phenomena, PAs are embedded in a net of historically evolved 
institutions. Thus, PAs are likely to mean different things to firms with different 
national backgrounds. The ways in which PAs function are dependent upon how the 
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relations between representatives and managers have evolved historically, making it 
likely that the levels of commitment to the involvement of the workforce and their 
representatives will vary between managers from LMEs and CMEs. These differences 
are likely to become evident when companies and work groups with distinct national 
origins need to work together following a merger process. We can expect American 
managers to have difficulties in accepting the strong influence that labour 
representatives have on business strategies in Denmark, difficulties that would reflect 
conflicting contextual rationalities (Geppert et al. 2003). However, we can also expect 
hybrid forms of partnership to emerge, mixing the strong influence of trade unions in 
Scandinavian countries with the more human resources-oriented strategies of 
American companies.  
  
Research Methods  
 
The interest of this research is on the phenomenon of cross-borders merger and its 
implications for employee influence in decision-making. The research approach is 
idiographic (i.e., case study-based). As Bengtsson et al. (1997) explain, idiographic 
research (the understanding of particular cases) is able to provide a rich description 
that emphasizes qualitative and multi-aspect concerns, in contrast to the nomothetic 
approach (general laws and procedures of exact science), which seeks statistical 
generalizations based on an analysis of a few aspects across large samples. The 
example here involves an in-depth case study, covering a period of three years. It 
describes the experience and determines the extent to which existing theories help us 
understand such cases or require modification (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The 
case-study methodology is useful in developing a processual and holistic approach 
(Elias, 1978) which fits well with neo-institutional theory. Case studies permit a deep 
exploration of how the institutional contexts in which MNCs are embedded impact on 
the way they are controlled and coordinated (Edwards et al., 2007). 
 
The company under investigation is one of the largest Danish companies and is 
considered very influential nationally, impacting on a great number of other local 
companies by virtue of its national legitimacy and great economic success. The case 
study provides a unique opportunity to investigate the organizational changes in PAs 
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from a longitudinal perspective under the complex conditions of a cross-border 
merger.  
 
The company was visited several times during the three-year period, and the research 
design was divided into three phases.1 During the first phase, workers, representatives 
and managers from different departments and hierarchical levels were interviewed. 
The interviews were semi-structured, and the intention was to provide an overview of 
current organizational processes and the functioning of PAs. During the second phase, 
one week of very intense fieldwork was carried in the company, with workers, top and 
middle managers, HR consultants, shop stewards and the convenor being interviewed. 
This was important in strengthening the validity of the conclusions through the use of 
multiple sources of information, including interviewing managers and workers from 
different levels and departments, which also helped to perform triangulation in the 
data analysis. The interviews were transcribed and codified using grounded theory 
methods.  
 
Observations at the shop-floor level were also carried out and interviews conducted 
whenever possible. The company was prepared to give access to documents related to 
investment in training, salary grades and even the firm’s confidential strategies. It also 
supplied some quantitative data and statistics, which improved knowledge of the 
socio-demographic characteristics of the employees. In a third phase, the author 
returned to the company twice and presented the analysis, which was discussed with 
the groups involved in the research. The number of interviews in the different phases 
can be seen in Table 1. 
 
 
Table I. Number of interviews in the different phases  
Insert Tab. I 
 
Findings: the two phases of the development of the case study 
 
                                                 
1 This article is based on data collected as a part of a larger research project investigating organizational 
changes in firms located in Denmark. 
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In this section, we present the case study. First, there is a shortened version of how the 
different companies pursued growth strategies and decided on the merger. Secondly, 
the organizational configuration of the PAs prior to the merger is explained. Finally, 
the changes in the characteristics of PAs after the merger are presented. 
 
The history of the merger  
 
During the 1990s one of the largest Danish companies (DC) started a process of 
multiple acquisitions. American and European companies were acquired and helped to 
bring together a global competence. In 1998 the hydraulic division of the company 
was split from the mother company and became an independent firm (D), which 
continued with its previous international expansion. During the same decade, a 
German company (G) developed an expansion strategy, which was designed to boost 
its grow through a processes of mergers and acquisitions, one of its first targets being 
a division of an American multinational company (AC) quoted on the New York 
stock exchange. AC then became part of the German family-owned firm.  
 
During their processes of expansion, G and D merged in 2000, forming GD. Currently 
GD is listed on the New York and Frankfurt stock exchanges. Two shareholders, the 
mother Danish company and the mother German company, own 38.5% each of GD 
stocks. After the merger the headquarters was transferred to Chicago, and a top 
managerial team chosen to manage GD was formed, mostly consisting of Americans 
who had previously been employed at the previously acquired American company.  
 
Since at the time of the merger the two companies did not have a significant overlap 
of products, the merger itself produced a succession of mutually beneficial marketing 
advantages for the companies, boosting sales in Europe and enabling the firm to 
establish a large and important share of the American market. Its American customers 
were few but large and important, and they demanded fewer product variants in larger 
amounts. Thus, the Danish factories were to handle hundreds of European customers 
and different products, as well as delivering to large American customers a few 
products in large batches. The explosive demand and rapidly increasing share of the 
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American market created permanent pressures on production. The Danish factories 
became victims of their own success. Since it was difficult for the Danish sites to 
deliver to the American market in a just-in-time system, many products had to be 
transported by air, thus undermining cost-effectiveness. The factories grew very 
rapidly by hiring several hundreds of new production employees, most of whom 
lacked the necessary qualifications to engage in high-performance, autonomous 
teams. The number of employees at the Danish site grew from 700 in 2000 to its 
current level of 2400 employees in 2006. Some features of GD are presented in Table 
2. 
 
Tab 2. GD profile 
 
First phase: partnership arrangements before the merger  
 
The factory has been under pressure to improve its production processes. It has been 
struggling with two models: mass production and flexible specialization. These two 
different ways of organizing production processes can be seen side by side in the 
factory. Highly Taylorised lines are integrated with highly flexible workshops in 
complex ways. Blue-collar jobs can range from being quite repetitive to highly 
flexible. The continuous upgrading of skills thus becomes an important factor for 
moving from the first to the second category, especially as the more repetitive jobs 
have continually been replaced by the use of new technologies. Thus, continuous 
upgrading of skills has become an important mechanism for increasing employability 
in the factory, as well as in the local labour market. 
 
Teams were considered a key element in the organizational landscape. In order to 
participate in this team organization, the skills development of all members was an 
important focus for management. It has been accepted in recent years that workers 
who are stimulated by their tasks are more likely to co-operate and to contribute to 
achieving organizational goals than those who are not. The contributions that workers 
can make to improve the performance of teams and to generate and share knowledge 
within a community of teams must be coordinated, as they have fundamental 
importance for HPWS. 
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“we cannot have workers who leave their brains at the front door. We use a number of 
new concepts which are based on participation. Workers need to solve problems, and 
they should not ask for help all the time. In the past, unskilled workers could not touch 
a tool, it was forbidden. Now they must solve problems. When they cannot, at least 
they need to be able to understand and explain what kind of problem the machine 
presents.” (line supervisor) 
 
The continuous upgrading of skills has thus become quite a central issue for both 
workers and management. Workers need to upgrade their skills in order to improve 
their employability. The company needs flexible workers who can optimize its 
production processes. This is done by participating in courses offered by the company 
and by local vocational institutions.  
 
Our data indicate that special and skilled workers repeatedly asked for courses that 
were closely related to their jobs, as well as ones which could improve their 
employability in the labour market.  
 
“I have attended many courses, all kinds. I started here seven years ago, and I knew 
nothing about factories. Now, I have attended several CNC courses, I can operate 
most of the machines in my department, and I’m asking my representative to help me 
to find new courses. You cannot stop, you know; you must be prepared – the future is 
uncertain"…” (special worker) 
 
Workers made use of the local training institutions with the support of the company. 
Their intention was to enhance their employability, so that they would be able to 
perform a large number of tasks related horizontally and vertically to their skills and 
jobs. 
 
In such a system, it is not surprising that skills development becomes an extremely 
important issue at the negotiating table between workers and management. It is not 
always possible to reconcile the different demands about which types of skills are 
going the benefit the company, the workers, or both. Because of their knowledge 
about how the vocational system can be used and transformed to serve local ambitions 
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and necessities, shop stewards become fundamental actors in negotiating with 
managers over which courses are more suitable in providing skills upgrading and 
consequently more organizational flexibility and enhanced employability for workers. 
The knowledge that such  representatives accumulate over the years is used to make 
contact with the vocational training institutions in order to create courses that enable 
employees to adapt to present and future working-life situations, job specifications, or 
career ambitions. At the same time, they also need to help companies improve their 
capabilities, since they negotiate courses which can support the requirements and 
ambitions or both firms and workers. As one representative explained: 
  
“when the company started talking about lean production, nobody knew what it was 
all about, then I asked my colleagues from other companies about lean, then I could 
learn about their experiences with lean. I used my contacts with the local vocational 
centre to design the courses necessary for our workers together with them.”  
 
By showing support for employee development, the company is likely to retain and 
attract the best workers locally, at the same avoiding an image that they are hindering 
workers from making the best possible use of supporting welfare institutions. As one 
supervisor explained:  
 
“highly engaged special workers can not only solve small maintenance problems, they 
can also anticipate many others, thus saving a lot of time and resources…many of 
these engaged workers are rewarded not only with higher salaries, but also with more 
courses…”.  
 
 Recognizing that representatives strengthen the links between the work force and 
vocational institutions, managers welcome representatives and convenors as 
participants in strategy construction and its continuous re-definition. By participating 
in strategy construction and linking it to their experiences at the shop-floor level, the 
representatives and convenors become fundamental partners with management in the 
evolution of and changes in the firm. As one middle manager explained: 
 
 “we have good relationships, we are always trying to find out a solution which can 
benefit both sides. This is not always possible, but it works like a bank accountant. 
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You know, everybody needs to put something there. This time I need a favour from 
them, next time they will need something from me…and in this way we keep things 
going on. Many times this involves a high level of compromise.”  
 
The organization is diverse, engaged in conflicts of interest and immersed in 
ambiguity. The picture It provides is not one of harmony among different working 
groups, but of actors trying to build an organization which is striving to attain and 
retain mutual recognition. For these groups, recognizing their diversity of interest 
helps to create flexibility in an environment which requires frequent modifications or 
changes to formal organizational structures and management practices.  
 
“It was not that easy in the beginning when I was elected a shop steward. Our 
supervisor is an old fashion guy, we had many fights, but the truth is we are partners 
now, we understand each other and we respect each other. We sometimes make 
agreements that go beyond what people would accept as…let’s say, reasonable, but it 
is working now…” 
 
Partnership functions at two different organizational levels. At the shop-floor level, 
representatives and middle managers work together to improve production processes, 
negotiating the conditions of changes, and solving the practical problems which 
continually emerge and impact on work conditions. In order to attend to the needs of 
the company and at the same time fulfilling the ambitions of the work force, the 
convener needs to be able to influence the company’s strategy company. This is made 
possible by participating at the advisory board level, the second level of PAs. The link 
between the different levels is effected by the convener, who is also responsible for 
dealing with local training institutions in order to create new courses and even new 
educational programmes to fit the ambitions of the different actors.  
 
  
Second phase: partnership and American management  
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The merger took place in 2000, and soon after the HQ was transferred to Chicago, and 
the Danish plant ceased to be part of the HQ of the Danish multinational, but, to the 
Americans, just another subsidiary among many.  However, during the three first 
years after the merger, the Danish site functioned independently from the HQ. 
 
“There was a lot of uncertainty after the merger, but we remained quite independent. 
The three years after the merger were quite intense, due to the great success of our 
products internationally, the great marketing synergy. Things started to change when 
the Americans arrived here. Before they were not only distant but also invisible” (top 
manager).  
 
In 2003, two American vice-presidents were chosen to manage the Danish subsidiary 
and started building a new managerial structure for decision-making and 
implementing lean production concepts in the site. After the merger, and in part due to 
the increases in production, defects and the turnover rate among employees increased. 
In spite of this, the factory was able maintain a high level of quality, but only at the 
expense of increasing costs that could not be absorbed by increasing prices, as GD 
was contractually committed to reducing prices by 2% annually. To approach these 
problems with lean methodologies seemed obvious to GD: mass production allied 
with quality, standardization and flexibility. Indeed, elements were already integrated 
in the approach that was adopted. But where organizational changes had always been 
a negotiated co-designing process in the Danish factories, the American top 
management team tried to change this, as we shall see below. 
  
In the past, an organizational change towards a new managerial model would have 
been negotiated at different organizational levels and with different work groups and 
their representatives. Despite a formerly strong partnership between the convenor and 
the CEO and a tradition of integrated bargaining, American managers were convinced 
that trade-union representatives in Denmark, as in any other country, would be solely 
preoccupied with employment, wages and working conditions. The survival of the 
company, its strategy and governance should not be on the agenda of trade-union 
representatives. They also assumed that a Danish company should be managed like an 
American company in the US. The big difference, according one of the American 
vice-presidents, was related to the overall change after the merger from ‘being the 
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headquarters’ to ‘being just another subsidiary’ in a much bigger corporation. This 
caused a change in the levels at which decisions were made, and as result some people 
who formerly participated were no longer included. One of the American vice-
presidents expressed the changes in how trade-union representatives should be 
involved in the decision-making process as follows: 
 
 “a leadership group decides to move some production from Denmark to Poland. 
Before we go public with that, before we reach the final conclusion, it is our 
obligation to sit with the union’s people and talk about that, but to say that we need 
ask them and include their input in this strategy, it is not my understanding of the 
requirement …at the end of the day we are the ones who are going to make the 
decisions for the business”.  
 
This kind of argument was unacceptable to the convener:  
 
“I need to know which departments are going to be outsourced. I need to know in 
order to negotiate a solution for workers who are employed in those departments. I 
need to know not in order to prevent it happening, but to create alternatives that can 
benefit the company and its employees. Americans do not know the difference between 
communication and information.”  
 
The information about new strategies became a formality, a way of dealing of the 
requirements of the law, not an organizational way to achieve a negotiated strategy.  
 
The Americans based their strategies on their own priorities, causing an intense 
restructuring in the new organization. The methods used to evaluate different 
performances changed. The first feature of the lean system that was introduced was 
the just-in-time information system. This enabled top management to control the 
results of the daily operations better than before: the production flow, the number of 
quality problems, the levels of buffers, etc. A huge amount of hard data started 
flowing daily from the production floor to the top managers. The information flowing 
towards the top levels became impressive, and the number of reports increased 
exponentially. However, the information did not return from the top.  
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“… under the new system, managers are preoccupied with their own future. It is a 
quite individualistic way of doing things: people are not so much preoccupied with the 
common destiny of the company, [and] the effect is an organizational mess, each 
department following its own route, without much collaboration with other 
departments…” (factory manager) 
 
The negotiation of new organizational solutions was suppressed. Local managers and 
representatives both lost access to valuable information, and their ability to negotiate 
was continually being reduced. It became a strategy of divide and rule. 
 
As the American managers and the convenor could not agree what information they 
could share and what level of participation in the decision-making process the 
convenor should have, the partnership between them started to deteriorate and totally 
disappeared after some months, turning instead into a very adversarial relationship. 
From the convenor side, the new top managers, who were mostly Americans, were 
either unable to understand the Danish systems of co-decision-making, or unwilling to 
accept co-operation and participation at the higher organizational levels. As managers 
were reluctant to release the necessary information, even though this was against 
general agreements in Denmark, the alternative was to insist on the reinforcement of 
and obedience to the general agreement and the law.  
 
The American managers learnt how to interpret the Danish law and keep furnishing 
the information they considered necessary to the representatives, but they did not 
consider it necessary for convenors and shop stewards to be active participants in the 
development of general strategies. Both parties seemed to take their roles for granted, 
the roles that each side is supposed to play in their own national systems of industrial 
relations. The Danish convenor assumed that he had the right to participate in the 
process of decision-making, even when the conditions changed from the Danish 
factory being the headquarters of a Danish multinational corporation to being just 
another part of a much larger multinational corporation. The American managers, on 
the other hand, simply transferred their interpretations of the possibilities for co-
operation between labour and capital from the US to this local community in 
Denmark.  
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The traditional partnership between shop stewards and Danish managers had avoided 
these tensions. The previous convenor argued that the partnership between managers 
and representatives had been working so well that he had made himself “unemployed” 
by decentralising most decisions to his representatives in the different departments. 
His job had become more focused on co-ordinating the work among representatives, 
as well as on more central issues that affected the whole labour force in the firm’s 
local sites. As the decentralization of tasks to shop stewards was already functioning 
well when the new convenor was elected and the American team was appointed, the 
changes did not have serious consequences for partnerships at the shop-floor level, 
which continued to function well. 
 
In the new managerial model, information flowed much less across horizontal 
boundaries and instead from units to the top. This information was about magnitude 
and time, while the ‘soft’ information about processes, through which the earlier 
results had been achieved, ceased to flow. According to the Danes, the flow of 
information was not necessarily linked with communication and mutual 
understanding, as strategies from the higher levels were simply informed about, not 
negotiated. Strategies at the shop-floor and middle levels, on the other hand, were 
negotiated but not communicated to the top. Thus many new boundaries and filters in 
the organization were constructed, and systematic communication among work teams 
was weakened. A small group could form a team and become almost insulated from 
its surroundings. To a great extent, different work groups became independent of each 
other in the factory. Meeting short-term demands and deadlines became the 
preoccupation.  
 
The managerial team from Chicago started working on the idea of outsourcing some 
departments of the factories in Denmark. For this reason, they interpreted the 
investment in human resources as a waste of time and resources, because several 
workers would soon cease to be employees of the company. One Danish top manager, 
who asked for an off-the-record interview, stated that the Americans had explicitly 
ordered that investment in human resources be slowed down, that employees were not 
to be seen as a priority for the development of the firm, and that blue-collar workers 
especially should be regarded as an easily discarded asset. From the American 
perspective, the previous way of upgrading skills seemed quite risky: why should a 
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company help employees to develop skills which the company had no use for either 
currently or in the near future, and which could even help employees find new jobs in 
another company? 
 
As information from the top ceased to flow, the previous process of shared decision-
making went with it. The convenor lost his capacity to know in which direction the 
company was moving, and consequently he was unable to link the needs of the 
company to the needs of the workforce. Workers became confused about the future of 
the factory, with more speculation to go on than real information. As a result, workers 
were investing time and resources in following courses that could improve their 
employability without necessarily benefiting GD. The courses being supported were 
aimed to deliver the minimal requirements for lean production and lean techniques. 
The previous innovative practices still existed, but overall coordination was difficult 
to maintain.  
 
Discussion   
 
The case-study findings show that the hybridization of different forms of employee 
influence in decision-making was difficult to produce. Actors were operating in a 
complex net of institutional relations with quite different taken-for-granted 
assumptions about how a firm should be governed and who should benefit from this. 
Conflicting institutional legacies were clearly at play. Two different organizational 
dynamics in the same company were presented in the two different moments of the 
merger: before and after introduction of the “American management model”. In the 
first phase, an ongoing process of blurring boundaries among organizational and 
professional groups was taking place, implying a large number of new issues for the 
newly constituted organizational groups.  Divisions that were more or less established 
became a matter of dispute, and strategies that seemed at face value demeaning for 
workers were defended by their representatives. Negotiation among actors was an 
important part of the organizational life in which actors could mutually influence each 
other’s choices and strategies.  
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Workers continually upgraded skills and, as a result, changing the temporary nature of 
organizational roles, thus also affecting the boundaries between the different 
organizational groups. These boundaries became blurred and were continually being 
redefined, which in turn encouraged negotiation among different work groups and 
between themselves and their managers. Skill formation and organizational change 
had become a multidimensional process, one in which actors continually needed to 
redefine their roles and skills. The continuous transformation in the nature of skills 
that this process engendered made the links between the firm and the training 
institutions fundamental for workers. 
 
Shop stewards and convenors represented a large variety of organizational groups and 
interests at different levels, both internally and externally; they were highly mobile 
and could cut across several organizational boundaries. As representatives engaged in 
negotiations at different organizational levels with different actors, new issues for 
negotiation continually emerged. This organizational mobility permitted them to gain 
access to and accumulate higher levels of information, which in turn reinforced their 
bargaining and persuasive power in the various organizational forums. Armed with 
such a level of mobility and information, they had become able to create coalitions 
and partnerships and to negotiate with different actors, thus influencing organizational 
strategies and goals. 
 
The company was a clear example of a new organizational form where actors needed 
to show a willingness to adjust their position constantly, thus being able to adapt their 
strategies when persuasive counterarguments were presented. Managers and 
representatives continually needed to justify their own choices to each other and to the 
groups they represented. This seemed to be fundamental, since the roles of managers 
and convenors were not clearly defined. To be involved in the continuous processes of 
negotiation and participation, in which apparently contradictory choices must be 
justified, makes the life of managers and convenors more interdependent. 
 
If decisions are to be seen as being justified, employees need to view the decision-
making process as responsive to their concerns, especially in relation to health, 
security, education and distributional issues. This does not mean that hierarchy totally 
disappears from organizational life. “Partnership” and “hierarchy” are overlapping 
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organizational principles which constantly challenge each other in the search for 
mutually acceptable solutions to pressing problems (Kristensen and Rocha, 
forthcoming).   
 
During the second phase, when the PAs stopped functioning at a higher level, 
although the systems as a whole did not collapse, the information flow and the 
deliberative processes became compromised to a great extent. As a result, the 
problematic areas drove the convenor to adopt a strong adversarial position in his 
approach to top management. However, at the middle level the PAs survived, with 
Danish managers becoming adversarial in relation to American managers while still 
maintaining their cooperative relations with the Danish representatives. 
 
As mergers and acquisitions have become the most prevalent mode of 
internationalization, we can assume that the problems faced by managers and 
representatives in our case are also becoming quite widespread. Representatives may 
try in different ways to convince foreign companies about the possibilities and mutual 
benefits of partnership. However, workers also turned down representatives whom 
they felt had learned to act in partnership with managers in a way that was too 
favourable to the latter. Thus, there are good reasons for anticipating that partnership 
might always be unstable in this type of multinational corporation. Representatives 
need to attend the increasing demands of the workforce. Local managers, on the other 
hand, are continually being pressured to cope with the demands of their headquarters, 
which is constantly drawing up new measures and benchmarks for performance, and 
demanding the introduction of novel HRM practices, so that plant organization and 
governance are constantly in flux and under negotiation.   
 
In the present case, a hybridized form of PA could not emerge between the Danish 
and the American models of employee participation in co-decision-making. Two areas 
of disagreement were fundamental in blocking the development of PAs after the 
cross-border merger: the bases for the different governance models, and industrial 
relations. First, there was incompatibility between the two governance regimes 
involved and the possibilities they engendered for the different actors to strategize. 
The sources of legitimacy in decision-making moved from the development of the 
company and its work force in the long run towards the idea of shareholder value and 
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ownerships rights. The American management team appealed to legality and 
efficiency as sources of justification (Kely, 2004), in doing so raising questions about 
the whole idea of how and why partnerships should function. Danish representatives 
expected much more attention to the concerns of all stake-holders. The new 
governance model was more top-down and centralized than the Danish one. There is 
not so much space for negotiation between partners in the American governance 
model.  
 
Secondly, the industrial relations models involved affected how actors expected PAs 
to function. American managers expected support for managerial strategies without 
having to open the necessary channels for information and influence over the 
company’s strategy. American managers in Denmark seemed constrained by the 
general US hostility towards unions and employee representation in MNCs (Ferner et 
al., 2005). Danish representatives expected more access to information and 
opportunities to influence strategies than top management was willing to provide. 
 
The changes in PAs adversely affected the process of skills formation and upgrading, 
which was a fundamental issue for representatives and the labour force. The shop 
steward was no longer able to influence how the strategies of the company and the 
ambitions of its labour force could be combined. Instead of a hybrid form of 
partnership, the result was the deterioration of the existing PAs.  
 
These developments in the company pose the question as to what may happen in the 
long run? Will the local system survive at the middle and lower levels and even re-
appear at the higher levels, or will mistrust infect and undermine the remaining levels 
of co-operation? This points to an important line of research, which should combine 
institutional theory and a power/interest perspective in a longitudinal study. This 
underpins our understanding of how and when MNC subsidiary actors are able to 
mobilize the resources to shape the implementation of certain imported practices in 
their unit (Ferner et al., 2005;  Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005). In the present case, the 
longitudinal perspective represented an interesting way to investigate the development 
of PAs over time, showing how the clash between two opposed governance systems 
had important consequences for the good functioning of the firm.  
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Case-study methodologies restrict the possibilities for generalisations from the 
findings. However, the institutional analysis was intended to uncover the basis for 
strategic action, the different forms of governance and the different forms of 
justification. Therefore, based on the analysis of the case, it is possible to argue that 
hybrid forms of co-decision-making are rather difficult to make sustainable, and that 
when they do take place, they will be intrinsically unstable. The different forms of 
justification for decision-making in different governance models may show strong 
incompatibilities, as the share-holder value ideology, which is so important for 
American management, is difficult to combine with the ‘stake-holder’ traditions of 
Scandinavian and other continental European countries. The different national 
industrial-relations traditions may also present incompatible features, like the 
resistance to trade unions that American companies share and attempt to export to 
their subsidiaries abroad. As Djelic and Quack (2003a,b) have suggested, ‘dominant 
foreign players’ may become ‘missionaries’ of institutional change by trying to export 
their own national models, thus possibly being able to institutionalize their own 
national rules in foreign  contexts. If this is the case, the spread of a ‘share-holder’ 
value ideology among continental European countries may have adverse 
consequences for established patterns of co-decision-making processes. 
 
 
This article has pointed out an important area of research which needs further 
investigation: the dichotomy between home and host countries in a business 
environment populated by companies that are the result of cross- borders mergers and 
acquisitions, where the Anglo Saxon governance model is considered by many firms 
to be the most adequate to support the internationalization process. On the one hand, 
the growing internationalization of American companies can be expected to impact 
strongly on established national patterns of co-decision-making due to 
incompatibilities between the different industrial traditions and management models.  
On the other hand, the increasing tensions between the different actors involved may 
generate new patterns of action among trade unions and their representatives, as the 
nature of national business systems has an impact on how actors perceive and accept 
the level of influence that they and the other actors have the right to pursue. A 
reaction within Scandinavian trade-union movements may also be expected to change 
the balance of power between multinational companies and local actors. Therefore, in 
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the long run, local actors may also be expected to re-establish their previous ways of 
co-operating and creating partnership arrangements.   
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Tab. I 
 First Phase Second Phase Third Phase 
Top managers 1 4 2 
Middle Managers 2 5 4 
Convenor 1 1 1 
Shop Steward 1 2 2 
HR Consultants 1 4 2 
Supervisors 1 4 3 
Blue-collar 
workers 
4 18 1 
Total 11 40 14 
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Tab II – GD profile 
 
 
 
 
GD  
Products Electro hydraulic motors 
and controllers for off-
highway machinery 
industry 
Employees worldwide 
(2006) 
9,000 
Employees in Denmark 
(2006) 
2,400 
Revenue (2006) $1,7 billion 
